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I. INTRODUCTION
A jackpot close to eighty thousand dollars awaits one of the many who
flock to the Seminole reservation with hopes of picking the lucky eight
numbers.' Although the Florida Constitution prohibits gambling except for
I. The Seminole reservation conducts a do-it-yourself bingo whereby a person can win
the jackpot if he correctly chooses eight numbers ranging from one to seventy-five, and those
1
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pari-mutuel games 2 and state-run lotteries,3 approximately twelve hundred
persons each night gamble at the Seminole reservation, which offers casino-
style entertainment.4 The Seminoles are a federally recognized tribe and
are therefore subject to the plenary power of the federal government. Thus,
the State of Florida plays a limited role in regulating the tribe.'
In 1988, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") was enacted by
Congress to provide clear standards for the conduct of gaming on Indian
lands.6 The purpose of IGRA is to promote tribal economic development,
self-sufficiency, and a strong tribal government.7 IGRA has prompted
many tribes nationwide, including the Seminole Tribe of Florida, to conduct
casino-style gambling operations.8 However, many casino-style games the
tribes wish to operate must first be negotiated under a Tribal-State
compact. 9 Presently, the Seminole Tribe of Florida is engaged in litigation
against the State of Florida, claiming that the state has violated IGRA by
failing to negotiate in good faith.' ° In Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
numbers are called before the twenty-first number has been selected.
2. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
3. Id. art. X, § 15.
4. The Seminoles offer 162 electronic video machines. The electronic machines include
modem-style slot machines and Superpick Lotto. Superpick Lotto is played by choosing six
numbers ranging from zero to nine; if at least two of the player's numbers correspond to the
numbers displayed by the machine, the player receives credits which can be exchanged for
money. The video machines carry a jackpot close to $21,000. Furthermore, the Seminoles
offer high-stakes bingo. A regular session of bingo consists of twenty games which offer a
prize to a single winner as high as $1199. (The above statistics are based on personal
observations of the author.)
5. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
6. See id. § 2702.
7. Id. § 2702(1).
8. Tom Davidson & Bob French, Support for Casino Gambling, Bingo Evident at Tribal
Powwow, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 10, 1992, at BI. Since IGRA, there have been at least 23
casino-style operations opened. Id. In 1992, there were at least 140 Indian gambling
operations in business in the United States, which were estimated to bring in $1.3 billion
dollars in revenue. Id.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(!)(C) (1988). Furthermore, the United States Code provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III
gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State
in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations ... of gaming
activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
10. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. State, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at * 1 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 22, 1993).
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State," the parties disagree as to which games are permitted by the state
and are thereby negotiable under the Tribal-State compact.' 2 The state
maintains that "slot machines" are not negotiable under the compact because
Florida law does not permit such machines to be operated within the
state.' 3 The tribe asserts that the machines are in fact permitted within the
state, and are therefore negotiable under the compact. 4 Meanwhile, the
Seminoles continue to offer the electronic gambling machines at the
reservation despite the absence of a Tribal-State compact.
Indian gaming plays an interesting role in the development of gambling
in Florida. This article examines the history of gambling in Florida,
including the undertaking of illegal gambling, the corruption of law
enforcement agencies, and the subsequent changes to the Florida Con-
stitution due to changing public opinion. This article also explores the
emergence of Indian gaming in Florida, the federal enactments pertaining
to tribes, and a particular decision of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida which held in favor of the state. Finally, this
article discusses the future of gaming in Florida and the probable outcome
of full-scale casino gambling within the state.
II. FLORIDA'S GAMBLING HISTORY
In the early 1800's, lotteries were common in many states as a means
of raising revenue." In 1828, the territorial legislature of Florida created
Union Academy in Jacksonville, and authorized its trustees to raise revenue
by conducting a lottery. 6 However, lotteries were short-lived in Florida
when the Legislature, in 1832, enacted the first statute pertaining to
gambling. This statute prohibited and punished the playing and betting of
II. Id.
12. Id. Under the IGRA, class III gaming activities include banking card games,
electronic facsimiles of any game of chance, or slot machines. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
In order for class III games to be lawful, the activities must be authorized by an ordinance
adopted by the governing body of the tribe, meet approval by the Chairman of the National
Indian Gaming Commission, and be an activity which is located within a state that permits
it by any person, organization, or entity. Id. § 2710(d)(I).
13. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *1.
14. Id.
15. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State, 234 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1970). In
1823, Maryland authorized a state lottery for the purpose of raising revenue for Washington
College, a statue of George Washington, and turnpike roads. Id.
16. Id.
19941 1067
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any game of cards, dice, checks, billiards, or any other instrument used for
the purpose of betting.'7 Furthermore, even though lotteries had proven to
be a worthwhile source of revenue for the creation of many educational
institutions, 8 a large number of states, including Florida, instituted
constitutional bans against state lotteries.' 9 In 1885, Florida's Constitution
provided that "the authorization of lotteries by the legislature is inhibited,
and the sale of lottery tickets shall not be allowed., 20  This lottery
prohibition, according to the Florida Supreme Court, was in response to the
widespread infestation that the lottery preyed upon the hard earnings of the
poor.2 ' The prohibition against lotteries accomplished its intended goal
of morality for a while, but a much stronger force brought the Legislature
to a realization; the Great Depression and failing tourism were debilitating
state revenue.
In 1931, Florida legalized pari-mutuel betting on horses, which
guaranteed state and local governments millions of dollars of revenue to
help relieve the paralyzation of the Depression.22 The Legislature had
become by that time a full-fledged partner in the gambling business by
authorizing track-run betting pools and taking cuts off the top.23 The
17. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 490 (1935).
18. Marc Fisher, Gambling Goes Way Back Moses, Jefferson Indulged, MIAMI HERALD,
May 18, 1986, at 24A. The proceeds from lotteries helped pay for the renovation of Faneuil
Hall in Boston and for the establishment of Harvard, Yale, and Dartmouth colleges in the
early seventeenth century. Id.
19. By 1885, 29 state constitutions had prohibited lotteries. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art.
V, § 41 (1868); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885); IOWA CONST. art. I11, § 28 (1857); MIcH.
CONST. art. IV, § 27 (1850); N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1844); R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 12
(1842); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1834); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1848).
20. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885).
21. Lee, 163 So. at 489.
22. See ch. 14832, 1931 Fla. Laws 679. According to the First Research Corporation,
"the state's desire for a new source of revenue so desperately needed overshadowed any
moralistic concept that this taxation would serve as a control for some sort of unwanted
gaming thought distasteful to the citizenry." FLORIDA RESEARCH CORP., STUDY OF THE
PARIMUTUEL INDUSTRY: STATE OF FLA. 4 (1968). The legislation stipulated that each of the
67 counties would share equally in the revenue derived from pari-mutuel racing. Id. Today
the games contribute over $105 million to the state. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div.
OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 33.
23. John D. McKinnon, Legislature Seems Ready to Take a Chance, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1991, at BI.
In the fiscal year 1931-1932, state revenue from pari-mutuel racing amounted to
$737,301, or 4.25% of the total pari-mutuel handle. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div.
OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 33. Total paid attendance at the pari-mutuel games
was 1,157,161 through 462 racing days. Id. This figure steadily increased, as did the
1068 [Vol. 18
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legalization of pari-mutuel racing was not only an answer for the much
needed revenue, but was also an indication of what the public desired.
However, the legalization of horse racing neither fulfilled the public's
hunger for gambling entertainment nor solved Florida's revenue problems.
As a result, the Legislature in 1935 legalized slot machines.
24
Although slot machines existed throughout the state prior to legaliza-
tion, the state was now in a position to regulate their use and derive revenue
from their operation. Nonetheless, two years later the law was repealed.25
Slot machines had proven to be an attraction to tourists and a worthwhile
source of revenue to Floridians. Consequently, illegal gambling enterprises
flourished in South Florida.
26
Illegal gambling was considered a solution to the plight brought to
South Florida by the bust of the land boom in 1925, the hurricane destruc-
tion in 1926 and 1928, the stock market crash of 1929, and the Great
Depression." Local politicians and law enforcement agencies protected the
illegal operations in order to bolster tourism and satisfy their constituents.2 8
number of racing days. Id. In 1946, the total state revenue from the pari-mutuel wagering
soared to $15,554,034, or 7.35% of the handle. Id. Furthermore, the racing days amounted
to 1442 with 4,448,084 in paid attendance. Id. Since legalizing pari-mutuel wagering, over
one-half billion people have attended the games, which translates into $2,920,064,124 dollars
of revenue collected by the state. 1992 FLA. DEP'T OF Bus. REG., Div. OF PARI-MUTUEL
WAGERING ANN. REP. 33.
24. Seech. 17257, 1935 Fla. Laws 1085 (repealed 1937). The law permitted the opera-
tion of automatic coin-operated vending "slot machines" and required the person intending
to set up operation of the device to obtain a license. Id. The reason for the legalization of
the "slot machines," according to Carl W. Burnett, a representative of Madison County, was
the realization that "slot machines [were] here and nobody [had] been able to stop them and
we can get revenue from them under this bill." FLA. HOUSE OF REP. J. 981 (May 21, 1935)
(statement by Carl W. Burnett, Rep. Madison).
25. See ch. 18143, 1937 Fla. Laws 909.
26. Dan Ray, Sheriff Was a Sure Bet, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 1985, at CI. In Dade
County, the S&G syndicate operated a series of bookmaking houses, while in Palm Beach
County, the Beach Club was known to attract the wealthy to its gaming tables. Id. Broward
County housed many casino operations: the Colonial Inn, the Lopez Restaurant, the Casa
Grande in Hallandale, the Club Greenacres, the It Club near Port Everglades, and the Valhalla
Club in Hollywood. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. Walter R. Clark, Broward County Sheriff from 1933 to 1950, was part-
owner of a slot machine company and permitted the illegal casino operations to flourish
throughout South Florida. Ray, supra note 26, at C 1. Clark maintained that he looked the
other way because he was "elected on the liberal ticket, and the people want it [casinos] and
they enjoy it." Id. J.B. Wiles Jr., a county commissioner from 1941 to 1949, commented
on the authorities who authorized the illegal gambling, and stated that "they were running the
10691994]
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However, casino gambling in South Florida soon came to an end in 1950
when the United States Senate Hearings, conducted by Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee, informed the nation of South Florida's illegal gambling
operations and exposed its governmental corruption.2 9  The Kefauver
committee hearings led to the shutdown of South Florida casinos in 19 50 .3o
Although illegal casinos had been effectively closed by Kefauver and
South Florida's economy had made a steady recovery, the public's pursuit
of legalized gambling still had not subsided. Consequently, with the passage
of the 1968 Constitution, Florida's tight grip on prohibiting lotteries had
weakened. Pari-mutuel pools, which included horse racing, dog racing, and
jai-alai, were now permitted within the state.3 Shortly thereafter, Florida
again weakened its stand against gambling when the pari-mutuel games,
permitted under article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution, were now
extended to include bingo. This extension was the result of an interpretation
of the constitution by the Florida Supreme Court in Greater Loretta
Improvement Ass 'n v. State. 2 The supreme court concluded that the same
legislature that passed the bingo statute 33 and that permitted certain
charitable, nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo games was instrumental
in the writing and passage of the 1968 constitution.34 Therefore, the court
concluded, bingo must have been included with horse racing, dog racing,
and jai-alai as exceptions to the lottery prohibition.35 The court's determi-
nation to declare the bingo statute constitutional came in response to
changing public opinion in favor of legalized gambling in Florida. 6
Over the next decade, the public's desire for legalized gambling was
evident by its repeated attempts to amend the Florida Constitution by
county in line with the thinking of the people of Broward County at the time." Id.
29. Id. Kefauver's committee took aim at ending corruption in government; the United
States Senate Hearings exposed Sheriff Clark who was subsequently removed from office and
indicted on gambling and tax evasion charges. Id. He was ultimately acquitted. Ray, supra
note 26, at Cl.
30. Id.
31. See article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution which provides: "Lotteries, other
than the types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitu-
tion, are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
32. 234 So. 2d 665, 671 (Fla. 1970).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
34. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 670-71.
35. Id. at 671.
36. Id. at 672. The court determined that the moral issue concerning bingo is a matter
of legislative concern; therefore, the court relied upon the fact that the Legislature, which was
"directly responsible to the people," had legalized pari-mutuel pools, which included bingo.
Id,
1070 [Vol. 18
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initiative.3 7 Although Florida may not have been prepared to permit casino
gambling within the state by 1986, the public was more than ready to permit
a state-run lottery for education. On November 4, 1986, a proposal to
authorize a state-run lottery was placed on the ballot for general election38
37. Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides the public with the means
of revising or amending the state constitution by initiative. A petition containing a copy of
the proposed amendment must be signed by a number of electors in each of one-half of the
congressional districts of the state. Of the state as a whole, the number of signatures must
be equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of the respective districts in the last
preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
In 1978, a proposed amendment to permit casinos on Miami Beach was placed on the
statewide ballot. Article X, section 15 of the Florida Constitution would have provided:
Casino Gambling: The operation of state regulated privately owned
gambling casinos is hereby authorized only within the following limited area:
That area of Dade and Broward Counties, Florida, bounded on the East by
the Atlantic Ocean; on the West by the centerline of ... Collins Avenue from
its intersection with 5th- Street southerly to Biscayne Street and the southerly
prolongation of the centerline of Collins Avenue to an intersection with the
centerline of Government Cut; bounded on the South by the centerline of
Government Cut; and bounded by the North by the North line of Lot 1, Block
14, Beverly Beach, according to the Plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 22, Page
13, Broward County Records.
Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1978).
The plan was defeated in large part by then-governor Reubin Askew; the vote was 71%
to 29% against casinos. Paul Anderson, New Pro-Gambling Drive Kicks Off Soon, MIAMI
HERALD, June 23, 1983, at B6. In 1980 and 1984, Charles Rosen, president of Florida
Casinos Inc., initiated drives to legalize casinos in Florida, but was unsuccessful in placing
the proposal on the ballot. Id.
In 1986, a proposal to allow individual counties to determine whether to permit casino
gambling was placed on the ballot, but was defeated by 68.4% of the voters. William L.
Leary, The Florida Lottery Act, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732 n.12 (1987).
38. Leary, supranote 37, at 732. Ralph Turlington, former Commissioner of Education,
was responsible for and succeeded in obtaining the required number of signatures necessary
for the proposal to appear on the ballot in the general election. Id. The proposed amendment
to article X read as follows:
Section 15. State Operated Lotteries.-
a) Lotteries may be operated by the State.
b) If any subsections of the Amendment to the Florida Constitution are held
unconstitutional for containing more than one subject, this Amendment shall be
limited to subsection (a) above.
c) This amendment shall be implemented as follows:
I) Schedule - On the effective date of this Amendment, the lotteries shall be
known as the Florida Education Lotteries. Net proceeds derived from the
lotteries shall be deposited to a state trust fund, to be designated The State
Education Lotteries Trust Fund, to be appropriated by the Legislature. The
schedule may be amended by general law.
1994] 1071
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and was overwhelmingly adopted by the citizens of Florida. 9
Indicative of the public's desire to gamble, the Florida lottery set
national sales records within the first twenty-four hours of operation,4° and
since its inception, the lottery has brought in much needed revenue with
Dade and Broward Counties leading the state in sales.4 Recently,
however, the lottery has declined in sales.42 Legislative revenue forecasters
maintain that the public's interest in the lottery has peaked.
3
In 1986, the state lottery may have temporarily fulfilled the public need
for gambling entertainment, but recent public interest in the lottery has
dulled." When the enthusiasm for horse racing dwindled in the 1930's,
the public turned to illegal gambling for excitement. Today, Floridians have
lost interest in the state lottery and have turned their attention towards a new
gambling enterprise: casino gambling on Indian reservations.45
III. FLORIDA INDIAN GAMING AND REGULATIONS BEFORE IGRA
The Florida Seminoles own more than 200,000 acres in South Florida;
Id. at 732 n.9.
39. Id. The general election revealed that 2,039,437, or 63.5% of the total 3,208,295
votes were cast in favor of the proposed amendment authorizing a state-run lottery. Id. at
732 n. 11.
40. Scott G. Campbell, Year Later, State Not Nearly Spent on Lottery, PALM BEACH
POST, Jan. 8, 1989, at AI. The Florida Lottery began operation on January 12, 1988. Id.
National records were set when Floridians purchased about $20 million in tickets within the
first 24 hours and about $95 million by the end of the first week. Id. In its first year of
operation, the lottery was played by almost 72% of the state's households, amounting to
approximately $1.6 billion spent. Id.
41. Fast Facts: Lotto's Sales, SUN-SENTINEL, May 13, 1993, at B1. Since January 12,
1988, the Florida Lottery has sold $10.7 billion worth of tickets, with $160,121,038.00 and
$99,343,993.50 coming from Dade and Broward Counties respectively, constituting most of
the sales in the state. Id. Over the five year period, sales from the lottery have generated
$3 billion for education, with 70% going to public schools kindergarten through twelfth
grade., 12% going to community colleges, and 15% going to public universities. Linda
Kleindienst, On-Line Lottery Pays $5 Billion in 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1993, at
A12.
42. Lottery's Earning Power Slips After 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at A 13.
Florida Lottery sales have dropped from $2.22 billion in the 1991-92 fiscal year to $2.17
billion in 1992-93 fiscal year. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See generally Don Van Natta, U.S., Tribe at Odds Over Game, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 29, 1991, at BI.
[Vol. 181072
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however, because most of the land is not productive, the tribe's ability to
generate income is limited.46  In 1934, Congress passed the Wheeler-
Howard B ill, 47 better known as the Indian Reorganization Act, which
sought to protect the land base of the tribes and enable them to create their
own governments. 48 In 1935, the Wheeler-Howard Bill went into effect,
49
and although not important to the Seminoles at the time, the Act exempted
the tribe from paying state and local taxes.50 This exemption has led the
tribe to conduct various money-making operations on their land,5 includ-
ing the first high-stakes bingo operation in the country.52 Although the
state authorizes certain charities to conduct bingo games, high-stakes
operations are prohibited. 3  In Greater Loretta Improvement Ass' v.
State,54 the Florida Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's charitable bingo statute" and provided the reasoning which ultimately
enabled the Seminoles to engage in high-stakes bingo operations.56
A. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State
In 1967, the Florida Legislature enacted section 849.093 of the Florida
Statutes, which permits certain charitable, nonprofit organizations to conduct
bingo games. 7  In Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State,58 the
46. James C. Clark, An Unpopular Act Became a Boon to the Seminoles, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 17, 1992, Florida at 8. During the 1800's, the Seminoles survived by
hunting and fishing in the Everglades; however, the Seminoles were deprived of a valuable
part of their holdings when a project to drain the Everglades began in 1906. Id.
47. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
48. See Florida Dep't of Business Reg. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 768 F.2d
1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
49. Clark, supra note 46, at 8. Unless tribes voted not to be included, the act was to go
into effect in 1935. Id. Out of the 500 eligible voters in Florida, only 21 went to the polls.
Id. The voters unanimously voted for the measure despite the discouragement from tribal
leaders. Id.
50. Id.
51. Clark, supra note 46. In the 1970's, the Seminoles initiated the tax-free sale of
cigarettes. Id.
52. See 133 CONG. REC. s2241 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992). Presently, Florida authorizes
charitable bingo. See FLA. STAT. § 849.0931 (Supp. 1992).
54. 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
55. See id.
56. Id.; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
57. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
58. 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970).
1994] 1073
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Florida Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the bingo statute
was constitutional under the prohibition against lotteries contained in the
1885 and 1968 constitutions.59 The court reasoned that when the Legisla-
ture imposed a license tax on certain gaming in 1879, including the bingo-
like game of "keno, '' 60 the Legislature had legalized the game by making
it a source of revenue for the state.61 This reasoning was upheld when the
exact language of the anti-lottery provision of the 1868 constitution was
written into the new constitution in 1885.62 Therefore, the court deter-
mined "[s]ince the Florida Legislature was empowered in 1879 to legalize
and license the bingo-like game of keno, it was empowered in 1967 to
legalize bingo. Precedent commands this conclusion."63  The supreme
court concluded the bingo statute64 was not in violation of the constitution-
al provision prohibiting lotteries.6 ' Bingo became another type of pari-
mutuel pool permitted by the state under Florida's Constitution article X,
section seven.66  This decision proved instrumental in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Butterworth,67 which provided the Seminoles with the authority
to conduct high-stakes bingo operations.
59. Id. The 1885 constitution provided for the prohibition of lotteries within the state,
while the 1968 constitution provides for the prohibition of lotteries with the exception of
parimutuel pools authorized by law. FLA. CONST. art. 111, § 23 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 7.
60. Keno is a game which is played and won by a player when he or she has five
numbers in a row on a card purchased by him or her corresponding with numbers on balls,
drawn from a globe, or other receptacle. Greater Loretta Improvement Ass 'n, 234 So. 2d at
668 [hereinafter "Loretta"].
61. Id. at 669. The Supreme Court relied upon an earlier decision which held that the
Legislature did have the power to impose a license tax on this game resembling bingo, and
as a result, the game was now legalized. See Overby v. State, 18 Fla. 178 (1881). Overby
was later verified by the Legislature when it expressly repealed all laws in conflict with its
licensing statute. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 669.
62. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 669.
63. Id.
64. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1979) (repealed 1992).
65. Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 671.
66. Id. Article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution reads: "Lotteries, other than the
types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law ... are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 7.
67. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
68. See id.
1074 [Vol. 18
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B. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth
In 1979, the Seminoles were offering bingo prizes of $10,000 as well
as new cars69 despite the existence of a state law limiting bingo prizes to
$100.70 Subsequently, Sheriff Butterworth's attempt to prevent Seminole
gaming by enforcing the bingo statute was circumvented in Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Butterworth.7' The Seminoles sought to permanently enjoin
the Sheriff of Broward County from enforcing Florida's bingo statute72 on
Indian Land. 73 The tribe had just constructed a $900,000 bingo hall, which
was in operation six days per week and delivering jackpots unquestionably
in violation of the bingo statute.74 Florida sought to prevent the Seminoles
from violating the statute by exercising criminal jurisdiction over the tribe
pursuant to Public Law 280. 7' The Fifth Circuit, relying on the Supreme
Court case of Bryan v. Itasca County,76 determined that states do not have
69. Clark, supra note 46.
70. Id. Section 849.093 of the Florida Statutes, which was repealed in 1992, stipulated
that:
(4) The number of days during which such organizations as are authorized
hereunder may conduct bingo or guest games per week shall not exceed two.
(5) No jackpot shall exceed the value of $100 in actual money or its equiva-
lent, and there shall be no more than one jackpot in any one night.
(6) There shall be only one prize or jackpot on any one day of play of $100.
All other game prizes shall not exceed $25.
(7) Each person involved in the conduct of any bingo or guest game must be
a resident of the community where the organization is located and a bona fide
member of the organization sponsoring such game and shall not be compensated
in any way for operation of said bingo or guest game.
FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1979) (repealed 1992).
71. 658 F,2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1991) (repealed 1992).
73. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311.
74. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 491 F. Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
75. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313. Public Law 280 conferred criminal and civil
jurisdiction on six named states which included: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
Furthermore, since Public Law 280 authorized all other states to assume such jurisdiction
over Indian country if they chose, Florida obtained civil and criminal jurisdiction in 1961.
See FLA. STAT. § 285.16 (1991).
76. 426 U.S, 373 (1976). The United States Supreme Court determined that Public Law
280 granted civil jurisdiction to the states only to the extent necessary to resolve private
disputes among Indians and between Indians and private citizens. Id. at 383. Utilizing
legislative history, the Court determined Public Law 280 does not give states general
regulatory powers over the Indian tribes because if Congress had intended to provide the
states with the power, it would have expressly said so. Id. at 390.
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general regulatory powers over Indian tribes under Public Law 280.
According to the Butterworth court, in order to apply Florida's bingo statute
to the Seminoles, the bingo statute would have to be criminal/prohibitory in
nature, and not merely civil/regulatory. 7 Since the Florida Supreme Court,
in Loretta, had previously determined that the bingo statute did not violate
the Florida Constitution,7" and the Legislature has "seen fit to permit bingo
as a form of recreation . . .but has chosen to regulate by imposing certain
limitations to avoid abuses,"79 the court held the playing of bingo was not
against public policy, and therefore, was regulatory in nature. 0
This authorization of high-stakes bingo on the Seminole reservation
triggered the rapid increase in Indian gaming enterprises across the
country;8' Native Americans had found a way to raise revenue and to
replace the lost federal aid desperately needed to build schools and health-
care clinics.82 Although Indian tribes around the country had found a
method to finally become self-reliant, many states sought to prevent the
tribes from conducting the games. 3 Subsequently, in 1987 the United
States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
[hereinafter "Cabazon"], 4 provided the support desperately sought by
many tribes around the country.8
77. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 313.
78. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 665.
79. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 314 (quoting in part Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144 (Fla.
1978)).
80. Id.
81. See 133 CONG. REC. S2241 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987). Within six years after
Butterworth, 100 bingo operations had opened on Indian lands and were estimated to generate
$100 million in annual revenues. Id.
According to the National Indian Gaming Commission, at least 140 Indian gambling
operations are in business in the United States. Tom Davidson & Bob French, Support for
Casino Gambling, Bingo Evident at Tribal Powwow, SuN-SENTtNEL, Jan. 10, 1992, at I B.
82. Davidson & French, supra note 81, at BI.
83. In Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981),
Wisconsin sought to prevent the Oneida Tribe from conducting high stakes bingo. The state
was unsuccessful in enforcing the state bingo law. Id. Subsequently, Wisconsin sought to
prevent the Lac du Flambeaus from operating their bingo hall. The court, in Lac du
Flambeau Band v. Williquette, 629 F. Supp. 689 (W.D Wis. 1986), held the bingo laws were
civil/regulatory in nature and unenforceable under Public Law 280. Id. In Barona Group of
Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983), the court determined the state was without jurisdiction over the
small tribe, and could not enforce the state law. Id.
84. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
85. Id.
1076 [Vol. 18
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C. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
The reinforcement of inherent tribal sovereignty was delivered by the
United States Supreme Court when California, under Public Law 280,
sought to prevent the Cabazon and Morongo bands of Mission Indians from
conducting high-stakes bingo on their reservations. 6 California asserted
that the tribes had violated the restrictions of the state's bingo statute8 7 by
failing to set limits on jackpots and providing payment to staff members for
their services.88 Although the tribes admitted their games violated the stat-
ute, they claimed the state had no authority to apply its gambling laws
within the reservations. 89  After recognizing that "a grant to States of
general civil regulatory power over Indian reservations would result in the
destruction of tribal institutions and values,"9 the Court concluded that
Public Law 280 "was not intended to effect total assimilation of Indian
tribes into mainstream American society."'" Because California did not
prohibit all forms of gambling, but actually permitted a substantial amount
of gambling, including pari-mutuel betting,92 bingo, 93 and a state-operated
lottery, 94 the state merely "regulates rather than prohibits gambling in
general and bingo in particular." 95
The Supreme Court, by utilizing the same regulatory analysis for Public
Law 280 as was applied in Butterworth,96 prudently favored tribal self-
sufficiency and self-government over the states' need to regulate.9 7
However, because Cabazon virtually depleted the power of the states to
regulate under Public Law 280, and existing federal law failed to provide
clear standards for tribal gaming operations, in 1988 Congress enacted the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 98 to provide a remedy.
86. Id.
87. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987). The statute permits charitable
organizations to conduct bingo games provided that the jackpots not exceed $250 per game
and staff members conducting the games are not paid for their services. Id.
88. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 206.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id.
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19400-667 (West 1964 & Supp. 1987).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 326.5 (West Supp. 1987).
94. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(d).
95. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
96. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
97. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202.
98. 25 U.S.C. § 2701-21 (1988).
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IV. THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") was introduced to resolve
the competing interests between tribes and states,99 which had become the
subject of considerable litigation. With the enactment of IGRA, Congress
sought to facilitate tribal self-sufficiency through Indian gaming operations
and to provide an adequate shield from corruption. 00 IGRA categorizes
gambling into three classes: 1) unregulated class I gaming includes social
games or ceremonial celebrations for prizes of minimal value;' 2) class
II gaming includes bingo and some card games,10 2 provided they are
explicitly authorized and played in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the state;0 3 and 3) class III gaming encompasses all other forms of
gambling including slot machines and banking card games.0 4
In order for class III gaming to be legally conducted on tribal lands, the
activity must: 1) be authorized by a tribal resolution and approved by the
Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission; 2) be located in a
state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization,
or entity; and 3) be conducted in conformity with a Tribal-State compact
99. 133 CONG. REC. E387 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987). State officials expressed a need to
regulate Indian gaming because the activity attracted organized crime. Id. Meanwhile, the
tribes wish to raise revenue, and have resisted these assertions of state jurisdiction. Id.
100. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988). The purpose of IGRA is:
1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a
means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments; 2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming
by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other cor-
rupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of
the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly
by both the operator and players; and 3) to declare that the establishment of
independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the estab-
lishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment
of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional
concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating
tribal revenue.
Id.
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
102. Id. § 2703(7)(A). "Class II gaming" includes those nonbanking card games where
players play against each other rather than the house, e.g. poker; "Class II gaming" does not
include banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack. 25 U.S.C. §
2703 (7)(B)(i) (1988).
103. Id. § 2703(7)(A).
104. Id. § 2703(8).
1078 [Vol. 18
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entered into by the Indian tribe and the state. 10 5 Any Indian tribe having
jurisdiction over Indian lands that wishes to conduct class III gaming must
request that the state in which the lands are located enter into negotiations
for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact.0 6 Upon receiving
notice, the state is obliged to negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to
enter into the compact. 107
Furthermore, IGRA provides for federal jurisdiction of any cause of
action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter
into negotiations, or failure to negotiate in good faith with the tribe.0 8 In
the event the court determines that the state failed to negotiate in good faith
with the tribe, the court may order the parties to conclude a compact within
a sixty-day period.0 9 Furthermore, if the parties fail to reach an agree-
ment, a court appointed mediator may select the proposed compact that best
comports with IGRA."' Although IGRA was envisioned to be a solution
to the myriad of litigation between tribes and states, the provision allowing
class Ill gaming under a Tribal-State compact has prompted the Seminoles,
as well as other tribes, to file suits against their respective states.
V. SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA
In Florida, the Seminoles have once again found themselves in
opposition with the state concerning reservation gambling.' The Semi-
105. Id. § 2710(d)(1).
106. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
107. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
108. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
109. Id. § 271 0(d)(7)(B)(iv).
110. Id.
IL. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). On January 29, 1991, Chairman James E. Billie wrote to Governor Lawton Chiles
requesting negotiation, pursuant to IGRA, for a Tribal-State compact permitting the
Seminoles to conduct certain "class Ill gaming" on their reservations. Seminole Tribe of
Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993). The Seminoles wished
to conduct poker, video games that duplicated poker, bingo, pull tabs, lotto, punch boards,
tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo. Id. On May 24, 1991, the State
asserted that poker would be the only activity negotiated for the Tribal-State compact. Id.
Subsequently, Tribal Chairman James Billie submitted additional requests to negotiate casino
gambling, but was again refused by the State. Id. On August 22, 1991, the State asserted
that it would only negotiate those activities expressly authorized by state statute, namely
poker, raffles, and pari-mutuel wagering on dogs, horse racing, and jai alai. Id.
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noles have recently brought suit against the State of Florida claiming that
it failed to negotiate in good faith a Tribal-State compact." 2  As a
defense, Florida claimed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,"3 but
the United States District Court, despite case authority to the contrary," 4
held state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was abrogated by Con-
gress under the Indian Commerce Clause." 5 Basically, Congress had the
power to permit tribes to sue states under IGRA notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment, which prevents states from being sued in federal
court.116
A. The Seminole's Arguments
1. A Regulatory Policy Towards Class III
Gaming Compels Negotiation
The Seminoles, who conduct gaming on tribal lands in Tampa and
Hollywood, maintain that negotiations for gambling machines (slot
machines) and casino-gambling are mandatory to conclude a Tribal-State
112. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
113. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 801. F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commence or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
114. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484
(W.D. Mich. 1992) [hereinafter "Sault Ste. Marie"]; Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington,
790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991). These courts reasoned that "mutuality of concession"
grants Congress the power to abrogate state immunity. Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. at
1488; Spokane Tribe of Indians, 790 F. Supp. at 1061. Since states have mutually surren-
dered immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to abrogate.
Id. Since Indians Tribes have retained their immunity from suits by the states, no mutuality
of concession exists. Id. Therefore, Congress did not have the authority to abrogate state
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id
115. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 801 F. Supp. at 657. The court determined the existence
of three exceptions to state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: I) a state may consent
to suit in federal court, or waive its immunity; 2) Congress may abrogate state immunity
when possessing the power; and 3) state officials, in their official capacities, may be sued to
obtain prospective relief. Id.
116. Id. The Seminole court reasoned that both the Indian and Interstate Commerce
Clauses are found in the same delegation of legislative authority. Id. Therefore, under the
Indian Commerce Clause, Congress had the power to abrogate state immunity. Seminole
Tribe of Fla., 801 F. Supp. at 657.
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compact, if any Class III gaming is permitted in Florida."7 Because Flori-
da expressly permits pari-mutuel wagering" 8  and a state-operated
lottery, 119 both class III gaming activities, the Seminoles assert that all
class III gaming is negotiable for a Tribal-State compact. 2 ° Relying upon
the Cabazon analysis, and the holdings in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v.
Connecticut'' and Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Wisconsin,'22 the Seminole tribe argues that, basically, all class
III games can be negotiated in the compact process unless Florida, as a
matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibits class III gaming
activities. 123
a. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut124 was the first case to
apply the Cabazon analysis of Public Law 280 to class ILL gaming activities
under IGRA. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe sought to operate casino-type
games of chance on its reservation, and requested that the State of Connecti-
cut enter into negotiations to form a Tribal-State compact in accordance
with IGRA.'25 The tribe asserted that since the state permitted "Las Vegas
Nights" under its constitution, 126 class III gaming could properly be the
subject for negotiation of a Tribal-State compact.'27 According to the
117. Id. The tribe maintains "permits such gaming" means if any class III gaming is
located within the state then all "class III gaming is up for negotiation." Seminole Tribe's
Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
118. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
119. See id. art. X, § 15.
120. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
121. 913 F2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1620 (1991).
122. 770 F, Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
123. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 18, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
124. 913 F.2d at 1024.
125. Id. at 1025.
126. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-186a-p (1989). The statute permits "Las VegasNights"
to be conducted by any nonprofit organization, association, or corporation. Such entities may
promote and operate games of chance to raise funds for the purposes of such organization,
association, or corporation, subject to specified conditions and limitations. Id.; see also
MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029.
127. MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1027.
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state, the limited authorization of "Las Vegas Nights" conducted by
nonprofit organizations did not satisfy the condition under IGRA that the
activity had been "permitted" by the state;128 therefore, because casino
gambling was actually against the public policy of Connecticut, there was
no obligation to negotiate a Tribal-State compact.
129
In determining whether casino-type gaming should be the subject of
negotiation, the court examined both congressional findings and legislative
history. 3' According to the congressional finding in 25 U.S.C. section
2701(5) of IGRA, "[i]ndian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically
prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not,
as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity."'31  Not only did the court determine the congressional finding
was consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in Cabazon, but
according to legislative history, 32 the requirement that class II gaming be
"located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity"'33 was likewise specifically adoptive of the
Cabazon rationale. 34  The Mashantucket court applied the legislative
intent behind class II gaming requirements, and assimilated its basis to class
III gaming due to the fact that both provisions contain identical lan-
guage.'35 Under this statutory construction, the court concluded that class
128. Id. According to IGRA, class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands
only if such activities are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity" 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (1988).
129. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3076.
133. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A) (1988).
134. MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029. The court referred to United States
v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 365 (8th Cir. 1990), for an interpretation
of the legislative history as to section 2710(b)(l)(A) and class 11 gaming. Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1029. The court in Sisseton revealed that Congress intended to
permit a particular gaming activity, even if conducted in a manner inconsistent with state law,
if the state law merely regulated, as opposed to completely barred, that particular gaming
activity. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 365.
135. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030. Both sections require that "such
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization or entity" 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (d)(l)(B) (1988).
Under a settled principle of statutory construction, "when the same word or phrase is
used in the same section of an act more than once, and the meaning is clear as used in one
1082 [Vol. 18
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III gaming should be negotiated in the compact process unless the state, "as
a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit[s] [class 1II] gaming
activity.' 36 The Mashantucket court held the state's approach to class III
gaming was regulatory rather than prohibitory because Connecticut not only
permitted "Las Vegas nights," but also a state-operated lottery, bingo, jai-
alai, and other forms of pari-mutuel betting. 137 Therefore, "such gaming
is not totally repugnant to the state's public policy," and should be the
subject of negotiations for a Tribal-State compact. 38 As a result of this
ruling, the state was forced to negotiate casino gambling, and the Mashan-
tucket Pequots now run one of the largest tribal casinos in the country with
an estimated revenue intake of $100 million a year."'
b. Lac du Flambeau Tribe
A case frequently cited by the Seminole Tribe of Florida is Lac du
Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin. 4' The
Flambeau Tribe filed suit against the state of Wisconsin under IGRA
alleging that it failed to negotiate in good faith for a Tribal-State com-
pact.'4 ' The tribe sought to conduct casino games, including video
gaming machines, roulette, slot machines, poker, and craps on their reserva-
tion. '42 Pursuant to the requirements of IGRA, the tribe submitted a
written request for Tribal-State compact negotiations. 43  With the
exception of lotteries and on-track pari-mutuel wagering, the state refused
to negotiate class II gaming with the tribe because those activities were
prohibited in Wisconsin. 144  Once again, the issue centered around the
meaning of section 2710(d)(1)(B) which requires that class III gaming
activities are "located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose
place, it will be construed to have the same meaning in the next place." MashantucketPequot
Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030 (quoting United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978)).
136. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1030 (alteration in original).
137. Id. at 1031-32.
138. Id.
139. Eric J. Swanson, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under the
Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 471, 480 (1992).
140. 770 F. Supp 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
141. Id. at 4-83.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 770 F. Supp. at 484
[hereinafter "Flambeau"].
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by any person, organization or entity . . . . ""' According to the state,
because casino gambling, video games, and slot machines were not
permitted for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity within
Wisconsin, it was not required to negotiate their use.'46 The state main-
tained it need only negotiate those particular activities that were operating
legally within the state."'
The court, in accord with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,14' resolved the
issue using the Cabazon analysis. 49 The court concluded "[t]he initial
question in determining whether Wisconsin 'permits' the gaming activities
at issue is not whether the state has given express approval to the playing
of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward class III
gaming is prohibitory or regulatory."' 50  If the policy is to prohibit all
forms of class III gaming by anyone, then the policy is characterized as
criminal/prohibitory, and the activities are not subject to negotiation.'
If the state allows some forms of class III gaming, even subject to extensive
regulation, then its policy is considered civil/regulatory and such activities
necessitate negotiation.'
In determining Wisconsin's public policy, the court found that for more
than a century, Wisconsin's Constitution had banned lotteries.' 53 The
prohibition was defined as the operation or playing of any game, scheme or
plan involving the element of prize, chance and consideration.'54 In 1987,
voters amended the Wisconsin Constitution to allow for a state-operated
lottery and pari-mutuel on-track betting.'5 According to the court, the
authorization of a state-operated lottery "removed any remaining constitu-
tional prohibition against state-operated games, schemes or plans involving
prize, chance and consideration ... ."156 As a result, Wisconsin's public
145. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
146. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 484.
147. Id. at 485.
148. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1024. The Flambeau court and the
Mashantucketcourt utilized identical analysis of legislative history and congressional findings
in order to determine that the Cabazon analysis should interpret 25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(1)(B)
of the IGRA. See id; Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
149. See Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 485.
150. Id. at 486.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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policy toward class III gaming was deemed regulatory in nature, and the
state was required to negotiate the requested activities.'57
2. Florida Permits Class III Games Sought for Negotiation
To further support the right to negotiate casino gambling, the
Seminoles alternatively argue that the activities they wish to conduct are
permitted by the State for three reasons. First, the Florida Lottery as well
as many Florida pari-mutuel facilities are permitted to utilize machinery
which is considered "illegal" under Florida statutes.' According to the
Seminoles, the prohibition of certain gambling devices defined under Florida
Statutes section 849.16 are actually permitted by the state 59 and are the
proper subject for negotiations on a Tribal-State compact. 60  Second, the
157. Id.
158. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 7, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). The Florida Lottery operates electronic machines for certain "on-line" lottery
games such as Cash 3, Play 4, Fantasy 5, and Lotto. Id. The terminals print out lottery
tickets showing numbers chosen by the consumer or randomly chosen by the computer. Id.
If the ticket reveals the winning numbers selected in Tallahassee, the holder is entitled to
receive money in exchange for the ticket. Id.
Furthermore, fifteen pari-mutuel facilities utilize automated machines (SAMS) which
enable a bettor to select his or her desired number or combination by inserting money,
vouchers, or credit cards into the machine. Id.
The machines utilized by the Florida Lottery and the various pari-mutuel facilities
fashion those prohibited under Florida Statutes section 849.16 (1991). Seminole Tribe of
Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum at 7, Seminole Tribe
of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
159. ld. Section 849.16 of Florida Statutes defines the machines and devices which
come within the provision of the law as:
1) Any machine or device is a slot machine or device within the provisions of
this chapter if it is one that is adapted for use in such a way that, as a result of
the insertion of any piece of money, coin, or other object, such machine or
device is caused to operate or may be operated and if the user, by reason of any
element of chance or of any other outcome of such operation unpredictable by
him, may:
a) Receive or become entitled to receive any piece of money, credit,
allowance, or thing of value, or any check, slug, token, or memoran-
durn, whether of value or otherwise, which may be exchanged for
any money, credit, allowance, or thing of value or which may be
given in trade ....
FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
160. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
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state expressly permits casino gambling when one-day gambling cruise ships
are authorized to use Florida ports for the expressed purpose of offering
casino-style entertainment on the high seas. 161 Finally, various charities
in Florida have conducted "Casino Nights," which include raising money
through the use of blackjack tables, roulette wheels, crap tables, and other
casino equipment. However, the state has repeatedly failed to enforce the
prohibition against casino gambling. 162  The Seminoles urge that the
authorization of these activities indicate that Florida "permits such gaming"
under IGRA and, therefore, gaming machines and casino gambling should
be negotiable for a Tribal-State compact.
163
B. The State's Counter-Arguments
1. The State is Not Obligated to Negotiate Any
Class III Game Not Expressly Permitted
In sharp contrast, the state urges that the Supreme Court analysis in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,164 which was relied upon
by the legislature with respect to class II gambling, cannot be applied to
class III gaming due to the substantial difference between the two classes of
activities. 65 Primarily, the state's reasoning hinges on the fact that class II
22, 1993).
161. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 8, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993). Section 849.231(3) of the Florida Statutes provides for an exception to the
prohibition against the possessionof gambling devices. See FLA. STAT. § 849.231(3) (1991).
"This section ... [does] not apply to a vessel of foreign registry or a vessel operated under
the authority of a country except the United States, while docked in this state or transiting
in the territorial waters of this state." Id.
Presently, three of the more than 47 cruise ships, which sail from Florida ports offering
casino gambling, are day cruises. Bob LaMendola, All Aboard for Big Bucks Cruise Ships
Reel in Money With Casino Games, SUN-SENTINEL, May 17, 1992, at Al. The day cruises
haul approximately 920,000 passengers each year, accounting for about one-third of South
Florida's cruise trade. Id. The day cruises travel out three miles beyond Florida waters, and
sail around for a few hours in order to provide casino gambling. Id. The cruise ships do not
contribute any gambling revenue to the state. Id.
162. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 6, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
163. Id. at 4.
164. 480 U.S. 202 (1986).
165. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 1, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D.
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gaming involves mainly "social" gambling, while class III gambling is "hard
core."' 66 The state simply asserts that the Mashantucket and Pequot courts
have erred in their legislative analysis of class III gaming, and alternatively
argues that legislative history indicates that states, during the compact
process, are to provide their expertise in gaming in order to instruct the
tribes as to appropriate regulation.'67 Therefore, it is argued that states are
not required to negotiate class III games which they do not permit because
states could not possibly render instruction on gaming they have not experi-
enced. '68
2. The Activities Permitted in Florida
Do Not Necessitate Negotiation
Although the state has proceeded to negotiate certain class III gaming
like horse racing, dog racing, and jai-alai, it has refused to negotiate on
gaming machines or casino gambling. 69 The state maintains that negotia-
tions hinge on activities which are "legal" within the state, and since slot
machines and casino gambling are illegal in Florida,' 70 the state need not
negotiate for their use.' 7' First, the state maintains that the machines
utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-mutuel facilities do not fit
within the context of the Florida Statute, 72 and are not gambling machines
as the tribe asserts. 73 According to the state, "[t]he statute requires that
the machine make the player entitled to receive some prize by reason of any
element of chance or of any other outcome of such operation unpredictable
Fla. Sept. 22, 1993).
166. Id.
167. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Pursuant to section 849.16 of the Florida Statutes, illegal gambling devices include
those which operate by insertion of money or an object, and by reason of chance, the player
may become entitled to receive money, or a ticket which may be exchanged for money. FLA.
STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
171. Defendant's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
172. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1991).
173. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
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by him."' 74  Therefore, because the machines utilized by the Florida
Lottery and pari-mutuel facilities do not operate to determine the prize, e.g.
the horse race, or the lottery numbers chosen in Tallahassee, the state does
not "permit" gambling machines as attested to by the Seminoles. 7 ' Fur-
thermore, the state asserts that casino gambling conducted by foreign flag
vessels who use Florida ports is only permitted in international waters, and
is a limited exception to the statute,'76 which criminally prohibits the
general possession of gambling paraphernalia.'77 Finally, the state refutes
the Tribe's argument concerning charity "Casino Nights" by indicating that
Florida "does not 'permit' casino gambling merely because a charitable
activity in violation of the state's statutory prohibition 78 is not high on
local law enforcement priorities." '
VI. SEMINOLE TRIBE V. FLORIDA: THE DISTRICT
COURT DECISION
Recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida has ruled against the Seminoles, concluding that the state did not
negotiate in bad faith under IGRA when the state refused to negotiate casino
gambling in the compact process. 8° The court agreed with the tribe "that
the legislative history relating to the phrase as found in the provision
governing Class II gaming is instructive regarding the meaning of the
language found in the provision governing Class III gaming."'' As a
result, the court concluded that "Congress intended the
174. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
175. Id.
176. FLA. STAT. § 849.231 (1991).
177. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
178. See FLA. STAT. § 849.231 (1991) (prohibiting possession of gambling parapherna-
lia); id. § 849.08 (prohibiting gambling in general); id. § 849.01 (prohibiting the keeping of
a gambling house).
179. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 11, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993).
180. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *17.
181. Id. at *12.
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prohibitory/regulatory analysis found in Cabazon to be consistent with and
to be applied to the IGRA provisions covering both Class 1I and Class III
gaming."
'182
The district court, however, refused to accept the tribe's argument that
the permittance of any class III gaming activity within the state opens
negotiations for all class III activities; in doing so, the court narrowly inter-
preted the cases upon which the tribe relied in support of its position.1
3
The court restrictively interpreted Mashantucket to stand for the
proposition that in order to compel negotiation of a class III gaming activity,
that particular activity must be permitted by statute and, therefore, merely
regulatory in nature."8 4 This analysis is not only restrictive of the essential
wording in Mashantucket, s5 but is likewise restrictive of the Cabazon
analysis.'86 When determining a state's public policy in the context of a
particular class III activity requested, the court is to look at whether class
III gaming in general is "totally repugnant to the State's public policy. '87
If the state permits other forms of gambling similiar in scope, i.e. a state-
operated lottery and pari-mutuel racing, the existence of those games reflect
upon that state's tolerance for that class of gaming.' Therefore, if a
state's public policy towards a class of activities is regulatory in nature, then
all class III activities are subject to negotiation provided they are requested
for by the tribe. 8 9
182. Id.
183. See id. at *13.
184. See id. at *14-15.
185. The Mashantucketcourt, in accordance with the wording in Cabazon, revealed that
Connecticut permitted "other forms of gambling, such as a state-operated lottery, bingo, jai
alai and other forms of pari-mutuel betting" which factored into the realization that
Connecticut's public policy towards class III gaming in general was regulatory. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031. Furthermore, the fact that charities were allowed to
conduct Las Vegas Nights was an additional factor in the court's conclusion "that the
Connecticut law applicable to class III gaming is regulatory rather than prohibitive." Id. at
1032.
186. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon the existence of other forms
of gambling to determine California's public policy towards the disputed activity. Cabazon,
480 U.S. at 210-11. "In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gam-
bling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we
must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo
in particular." Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
187. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031.
188. See id.
189. See id at 1030. The court stated, "The compact process is therefore to be invoked
unless, applying the Cabazon test, it is determined that the state, 'as a matter of criminal law
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The district court, interpreting Mashantucket, quoted the case, which
stated "This ruling means only that the State must negotiate with the Tribe
concerning the conduct of casino-type games of chance at the Reserva-
tion."' 90 This statement, in its proper context, does not indicate how the
court arrived at its holding, but indicates the state need only negotiate the
particular class III activity requested.' 9 ' An analysis of the Mashantucket
holding reveals that, in general, if the state's treatment of "class III gaming
is regulatory rather than prohibitive," this fact determines whether the state
must negotiate the class III activity requested. 192
In deciding whether Flambeau was applicable, the district court
dismissed that court's analysis because it had based its decision on an
erroneous interpretation of Cabazon.'93 Once again, the district court's
restrictive interpretation of Cabazon, as well Mashantucket, led to the
conclusion that the Flambeau holding was erroneous. 94 Flambeau stood
for the proposition that to determine whether a state must negotiate a
particular class III gaming activity, the "issue is not whether the state has
given express approval to the playing of a particular game," but whether the
state's "public policy toward class III gaming is prohibitory or regulato-
ry.' 95 This proposition is directly in line with the essential analysis in
both Cabazon and Mashantucket. '"
Furthermore, even if the Flambeau decision was not erroneously based,
the district court determined that review of Wisconsin's public policy
towards the disputed gaming activity is necessary under the Cabazon
analysis, and that reliance solely on a state's constitution is not indicative
of its public policy towards gambling. 97 Although this fact may be true,
the Seminole Tribe did not rely solely on the similiarities between the states'
constitutions in attempting to show an analogous public policy but in fact,
and public policy, prohibit[s] [class III] gaming activity."' Id. See also Flambeau, 770 F.
Supp. at 487. The Flambeau court stated, "the initial question in determing whether
Wisconsin 'permits' the gaming activities at issue is not whether the state has given express
approval to the playing of a particular game, but whether Wisconsin's public policy toward
class II1 gaming is prohibitory or regulatory." Id. at 486.
190. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *8 (quoting Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031-32).
191. See MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1032.
192. See id.
193. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *8.
194. Id.
195. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp at 486.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
197. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *18 n.1.
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the Seminoles asserted the similarities of both states' statutes, which still
prohibit various forms of casino gambling.'98 Therefore, the district court,
in its determination to find that Flambeau does not control this case,
attacked the court's interpretation of Cabazon and ignored the similiarities
between both states' statutory schemes with regard to the particular disputed
activity, casino gambling.'99
The Flambeau court, in determining Wisconsin's public policy,
examined the gradual diminution of that state's constitutional ban against
lotteries, and determined Wisconsin no longer prohibits gaming but rather
regulates it.2"' Likewise, Florida has diminished its constitutional strong-
hold on banning lotteries, which may indicate an analogous public policy
towards class III gaming."' Historically, both Florida and Wisconsin had
constitutional provisions banning all lotteries, °2 but eventually provided
for constitutional amendments and statutory provisions designed to permit
charitable bingo,"' pari-mutuel wagering,"' and state-operated lotter-
ies. 2°5  Although each state continues to criminally prohibit gambling
198. See Seminole Tribe's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1993). In the state of Florida, statutes provide criminal punishment for the operation of a
gambling machine or device. See FLA. STAT. § 849.15(1) (1991). In addition, the placing
of a bet or wagering of any money or thing of value is punishable. See id § 849.14 (1991).
The state of Wisconsin likewise provides criminal punishment for the making of a bet or
operating a gambling machine. See Wis. STAT. § 945.02 (1982).
199. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *18 n.l.
200. Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 486.
201. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 19, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
202. Both states included constitutional provisions which prohibited lotteries. See Wis.
CONST. art. IV, § 24 (1848); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 23 (1885).
203. In 1968, Florida adopted section 849.093, which permitted certain charitable,
nonprofit organizations to conduct bingo games. See FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1969) (repealed
1992). Furthermore, bingo was interpreted to be included as a parimutuel game under article
X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution. See Loretta, 234 So. 2d at 671.
In 1973, the Wisconsin Constitution was likewise amended to permit charitable
organizations to conduct bingo. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(3).
204. In 1968, the Florida Constitution was amended to permit pari-mutuel pools to
legally function within the state. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7. The constitutional amendment
permitted dog racing, horse racing, and jai alai. Id.
In 1987, the Wisconsin Constitution provided for the legalization of pari-mutuel, and
on-track wagering. See Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 24(5).
205. In 1987, both Wisconsin and Florida established state-operated lotteries by
constitutional amendment. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 24(6).
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activities," 6 this fact alone does not render a state's public policy as
prohibitory.2"7 According to the Supreme Court in Cabazon, the fact that
a state provides criminal punishment for certain gambling activities does not
necessarily make a prohibitory policy. 2 8 Therefore, this gradual acquies-
cence by both states to legalize gambling indicates a similar regulatory
scheme, and the holding in Flambeau should have controlled the outcome
in Seminole.2 °9
On the issue of whether the state in fact permits precisely those class
III activities the Tribe seeks to negotiate, the district court refused to accept
any argument. First, Judge Marcus admitted that "certain Florida charities
have conducted casino or Las Vegas nights," but did not believe that the
existence of thirty-three events evinces a public policy permitting casino
gambling.10 Once again, the court was unwilling to look towards the
211state's policy in general as to class III activities. Undoubtedly, utilizing
the Mashantucket and Flambeau analysis, the recorded existence of casino
gambling permitted by charities, as well as the existence of other class III
gaming, evinces a regulatory public policy permitting class III gaming in
general.21 2 Although the Tribe argued the similarity between the permit-
ting of Las Vegas nights in Florida with those permitted in Mashantucket,
the district court, consistent with its policy of restrictive interpretation, was
quick to point out that Connecticut "officially sanctioned the operation of
casino nights by way of statute.2 13
Next, the Seminole court was unimpressed with the tribe's assertion that
one-day gambling ships, which embark passengers from Florida ports with
no destination other than the high seas, evinces a regulatory public policy
toward casino gambling. 2 4 The district court relied upon the fact that no
gambling occurs within the territorial bounds of the State, but failed to
refute the argument that when given the ability to prohibit these specific
gambling cruises to nowhere, the state continues to permit the activity to
206. See supra text accompanying note 198.
207. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211.
208. Id.
209. Seminole Tribe of Florida's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Memorandum at 19, Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, (S.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 1993).
210. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *13.
211. See id.
212. See MashantucketPequot Tribe, 913 F.2d at 1031-32; Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at
486.
213. Seminole Tribe of Fla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *12.
214. Id. at *36.
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occur.
2 15
Finally, Judge Marcus, relying upon Deeb v. Stoutamire,21 6 deter-
mined that the machines utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-
mutuel facilities ("SAMS") 217 are not violative of Florida Statutes section
849.16.18 The court reasoned:
[T]he unpredictable event or element of chance which determines the
winner must be linked to the machine's operation. Thus, the winner at
a parimutuel facility is determined by the dog or horse race, not by the
operation of the SAMS machines. Similarly, the winner of the State
Lottery is determined by the weekly drawing in Tallahassee, not by the
operation of the individual lottery ticket terminals. 219
In review of the various issues raised by the tribe, as well as the pattern
by which the district court restrictively interpreted the word "permits" under
the IGRA, it is apparent that the court has not only miscontrued case law
supporting the tribe, but has ignored the basic legislative intent for enacting
IGRA. Congress intended to preserve tribal sovereignty while promoting
economic development and self-sufficiency.22 °
According to legislative history, the compact process was envisioned
to provide a rnechanism for "two sovereigns-the tribes and the States-[to]
sit down together in negotiations on equal terms and come up with a recom-
mended methodology for regulating class III gaming on Indian lands."22'
Legislative history provides no indication that compact negotiations would
depend upon what the State thought were appropriate activities for the tribe
to engage in, but rather Congress was explicit in reinforcing tribal sover-
eignty.22 2 The district court was obligated to adhere to Congress' intent
for enacting IGRA, and should, therefore, have liberally construed the word
"permits" in favor of the tribe and not the state. In this case, because the
sovereign state reaps the benefits from permitting a variety of class III
215. Id. at *38.
216. 53 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1951).
217. See supra text accompanying note 158.
218. See supra note 170.
219. Seminole Tribe of rla., No. 91-6756, 1993 WL 475999, at *16.
220. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
221. See 134 CONG. REC. S12651 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988).
222. Id. According to legislative history, the IGRA was not intended to be a "blanket
transfer to any State of any jurisdiction over Indian lands. Indian tribes are sovereign
governments and exercise rights of self-government over their lands and members. This bill
does not seek to invade or diminish that sovereignty." Id. at S12650.
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gaming activities, which include five forms of pari-mutuel wagering,"'
and four on-line computer games of the state-operated lottery,224 it is only
equitable that the other sovereign entity, the Seminole Tribe, who supposed-
ly is negotiating on "equal terms," have the facts liberally contrued in its
favor.
VII. THE FUTURE OF FLORIDA GAMBLING
The Seminoles will undoubtedly seek to negotiate for new machines
that conform to those utilized by the Florida Lottery and various pari-mutuel
facilities. The thrust of the argument will surely entail the length of the
period of time whereby the unpredictable event, which is determined by an
independent machine, must take place. The existence of these machines
may prove to be just as successful in luring the public as those machines
rejected by the Seminole court.
Additionally, the State of Florida has decided to negotiate an agreement
with the Seminoles that would allow the tribe to offer poker, pinochle,
bridge, and other card games without a pot limit.225 Players will legally
be able to wager thousands of dollars at these games,2 6 and the state will
not receive any revenue from it.227 This legalization of tribal card games
may be the beginning of what lies ahead for Florida's gambling future.
Even if the Seminoles lose on appeal, the tribe will continue to offer
machines conforming to the district court ruling and provide those card
games presently under negotiation. Consequently, many Florida gamblers,
as well as curious spectators, will flock to the reservations, and will spend
millions of dollars that will elude taxation by the state. As a result,
Florida's inability to tax the tribe creates a loss of potential revenue
desperately needed for crime prevention, public schools, and its rebuilding
program after Hurricane Andrew. As a solution, Florida should legalize
223. As of 1992, the state of Florida regulated 5 thoroughbred tracks, I quarter horse
track, 19 greyhound tracks, 1Ojai alai frontons, and I harness racing track. 1992 FLA. DEP'T
OF Bus. REG., Div. OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING ANN. REP. 23-32. The state received
6.06% of the total pari-mutuel handle from 5321 racing days which generated $105,074,018
in state revenue. Id. at 21.
224. In 1992, the Florida Lottery generated $2.17 billion in state revenue. Lottery's
Earning Power Slips After 5 Years, SUN-SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at A13.
225. Bob French, SeminolesSeek High-Stakes Gambling, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 1993,
at BI.
226. Id.
227. See Clark, supra note 46.
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casino gambling within the state and expand its economic base by taxing the
revenue acquired by regulated casino gaming facilities.
Although Floridians have the power to change Florida's constitional
prohibition against casino gambling,22 they have been reluctant to do so
for fear that legalization of casinos will bring organized crime and
corruption to the state. These fears are based erroneously on comparisons
with Las Vegas and Atlantic City, neither of which were as big or as
developed as; South Florida when their casinos were legalized.229
According to one authority, "Nevada has had the biggest problems
controlling organized crime in casinos for one simple reason: organized
crime built the industry. Inspired by the success of gangster Meyer
Lansky's casinos in Havana, Bugsy Siegel moved to Las Vegas and founded
a gambling empire."23 Nevada was a desert with no future, and officials
gladly received casino revenues no matter who was paying.' Presently,
Nevada has partially succeeded in eliminating organized crime and
corruption; however, the state still employs fewer than two regulatory
workers per licensed casino, thus enabling corruption to linger.232
By contrast, New Jersey employs nearly 100 regulators per casino, with
an annual budget of $50 million a year paid up-front by the casinos.233
In 1976, Atlantic City legalized casino gambling as a solution to its bleak
economy: tourism was failing, seaside hotels were deteriorating, the local
businesses were boarding up, and the unemployment rate was high and
climbing.23 4 Casino gambling proved to be the solution. Shortly thereafter,
Atlantic City became the most popular destination in America, drawing one-
third more people than Disney World, despite having nothing more to offer
than gambling.235 Casinos have not only provided Atlantic City with the
means for economic development,236 but have also provided the revenue
228. See supra text accompanying note 37.
229. Dave Von Drehle, Facts, Guesses About Casinos Consider Source Each Side Has
Its Own Vision of Future with Legal Gaming, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27, 1986, at AI.
230. Dave Von Drehle, Casinos and Crime: Can the House Rules Keep Out the Thugs?,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 1986, at Al. The authority was a law professor at the University
of California Berkeley, Jerome Skolnick. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Dave Von Drehle, Florida Casino Debate Goes to Boardwalk, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 15, 1986, at A7.
235. Id.
236. Id. In Atlantic City, casino hotels pay about two-thirds of all property taxes, in
addition to an eight percent tax on gross winnings to the state, plus sales taxes, licensing
1994] 1095
31
Bardakjy: Is There a Lucky Seven in Florida's Future?
Published by NSUWorks, 1994
Nova Law Review
revenue to enforce strict regulations in order to keep organized crime out of
the business. 37 Unfortunately, organized crime became involved in casino
operations when New Jersey made a tragic mistake with the first licensed
casino."' When gambling was approved in 1976, politicians promised
casinos in two years. Subsequently, political pressure induced the licensing
of Resorts International, despite investigative reports which provided
evidence showing the applicant's close ties to organized crime. 39 Present-
ly, the State of New Jersey requires every casino employee to be li-
censed, 4 ' and according to New Jersey officials, this has been successful
in keeping organized crime and corruption out of the day-to-day operations
of casinos."'
Florida retains a remarkable feature uncommon to Nevada and New
Jersey: diversity. Other than gambling, Nevada and New Jersey possess no
qualities that attract tourism. This may explain why visitors to those states
remain in hotel casinos while local shops and restaurants suffer.242
Conversely, if the state of Florida legalized casinos in order to allure
tourists, Orlando and South Florida attractions would provide the essential
assortment of entertainment to entice visitors to remain longer within the
state to fully explore its attributes.
In light of the fact that casinos could provide a solution to Florida's
bleak economy by creating 50,000 jobs, spurring $2.2 billion in new
investment, and doubling the tourist trade to $6.6 billion per year, 243 the
state's only option in response to its inability to tax the revenue from Indian
gaming is to legalize and regulate casinos within the state. As proven in
Atlantic City, the absence of political pressure, along with the. strict
enforcement of tough regulations, should adequately deter the negatives
associated with casino gambling. Therefore, Floridians, who hold the key
costs and regulation fees, plus a tax to supply about $800 million in loans over the next 20
years to build low-cost housing. Id. Furthermore, each casino hotel employs an average of
3600 people. Id.
237. Von Drehle, supra note 230, at Al.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. From the hotel waiter to the CEO, the state investigates criminal histories,
character, integrity, honesty, and finances. Id. Furthermore, administrators are required to
completely disclose all holdings, shareholders, bonds, and five years of IRS records. Von
Drehle, supra note 230, at Al.
241. Id.
242. Von Drehle, supra note 234, at A7. The average visitor to Atlantic City, who lives
less than 150 miles away, stays seven hours and spends $66 dollars. Id.
243. Von Drehle, supra note 229, at Al.
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to a prosperous future, should undoubtedly amend article X, section 7 of the
Florida Constitution244 in order to provide for the authorization of casino
gambling.24
VIII. CONCLUSION
The State of Florida has consistently reduced its constitutional
stronghold against gambling when faced with economic crises. As a result,
Florida permits pari-mutuel wagering and a state-operated lottery. In light
of the fact that the state, with its inability to tax Indian gaming, has
foregone a substantial amount of revenue desperately needed for a
diminished economy, Florida should once again diminish its stronghold
against gambling by legalizing the exact games it is currently trying to
prohibit.
Eugene Neimy Bardakjy
244. See article X, section 7 of the Florida Constitution, which provides: "Lotteries,
other than the types of pari-mutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this
constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
245. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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